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Abstract
Background: Infectious gastrointestinal illness (IGI) outbreaks have been reported in U.S. Navy
ships and could potentially have an adverse mission impact. Studies to date have been anecdotal.
Methods: We conducted a retrospective analysis of weekly reported disease and non-battle injury
health data collected in 2000 – 2001 from 44 U.S. Navy ships while sailing in the 5th Fleet (Persian
Gulf and nearby seas).
Results: During this period, 11 possible IGI outbreaks were identified. Overall, we found 3.3
outbreaks per 100 ship-weeks, a mean outbreak duration of 4.4 weeks, and a mean cumulative ship
population attack rate of 3.6%. Morbidity, represented by days lost due to personnel being placed
on sick-in-quarters status, was higher during outbreak weeks compared to non-outbreak weeks (p
= 0.002). No clear seasonal distribution was identified.
Conclusion: Explosive outbreaks due to viruses and bacteria with the potential of incapacitating
large proportions of the crew raise serious concerns of mission impact and military readiness.
Background
Persons living or working in closed settings, such as nurs-
ing homes, prisons, hospitals, or daycare centers, are at
elevated risk of infectious gastrointestinal illness (IGI)
[1,2]. In addition, IGI outbreaks have been found to occur
on both civilian cruise ships and military vessels [3,4],
with Norovirus being the most common pathogen identi-
fied [4]. Outbreaks in closed settings like these are often
difficult to prevent and control because the agents may
have multiple modes of transmission, low infectious
doses, and a large reservoir of susceptible persons (due to
the short-lived immunity and multiple strain types) [5].
For instance, Norovirus outbreaks may involve transmis-
sion by consumption of contaminated food or water,
direct person-to-person, airborne droplets of vomitus and
contaminated environmental surfaces [2,6].
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United States, Norovirus alone estimated to account for 23
million cases of acute gastroenteritis each year, and two-
thirds of all foodborne gastroenteritis cases [7]. Further-
more, the economic burden of these illnesses has been
particularly significant in the cruise ship industry, where
intensive time and resources have been spent to prevent,
identify and mitigate these outbreaks [8-10]. Whereas the
economic burden on the cruise ship industry may be con-
siderable, the importance of IGI in military settings affects
mission impact and readiness. A recent study describing
illness among U.S. Marine Corps personnel during the
early phase of combat in Iraq found that IGI were the lead-
ing cause of clinical visits, and nearly one-fourth of these
could be attributed to Norovirus [11]. Descriptions of IGI
outbreaks on single U.S. Navy vessels have been pub-
lished [12-15] including anecdotal reports of mission
impact, but descriptive epidemiology is lacking. Using a
retrospective study design analyzing weekly reporting data
that are routinely collected for disease and non-battle
injury (DNBI) surveillance, we describe the epidemiology
of possible IGI outbreaks on ships deployed to the Persian
Gulf region during a one-year period. These results are
compared to findings reported among similar surveys of
the cruise ship industry.
Methods
We performed an analysis on shipboard reports of disease
and non-battle injury (DNBI) to identify possible out-
breaks of infectious gastroenteritis on ships deployed to
the U.S. Navy 5th Fleet from October 2000 through Sep-
tember 2001. Beginning in February 2000, the U.S. Naval
Forces Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT) instituted
a weekly DNBI incident morbidity surveillance system for
all ships within its 'Area of Responsibility' (AOR) which
constitutes waters and littoral areas of the Arabian Gulf,
Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, Arabian Sea and
northwest Indian Ocean. This required each ship to sub-
mit a weekly aggregate DNBI report (standardized spread-
sheet format) to COMUSNAVCENT Fleet Surgeon's office.
The Fleet Surgeon's office collated all reports and for-
warded them to the Navy Environmental and Preventive
Medicine Unit #7 (NEPMU-7) located in Sicily, Italy. Each
week, NEPMU-7 personnel conducted trend analysis,
compiled a summary and reported back to the Fleet Sur-
geon's office any significant changes in DBNI rates. Integ-
rity checks were conducted on all data to ensure validity
that included logic checks of rates to measure consistency
with previously reported denominators and with numer-
ators for preceding weeks. Due to ship deployment
dynamics, vessels often entered and exited the Persian
Gulf region during the study period. While each ship
keeps track of its own trends in DNBI, the particular com-
mand to where it reports its weekly summary depends on
what AOR to which it is currently assigned. Therefore,
complete reporting for all weeks that a ship was deployed
was not available.
DNBI reporting standards define an IGI clinic visit as the
initial visit of all diagnoses consistent with infection of the
intestinal tract, including any type of diarrhea, gastroen-
teritis, "stomach flu", nausea/vomiting, or similar syn-
drome based on the physician's diagnosis. This category
does not include non-infectious intestinal diagnoses, such
as hemorrhoids, ulcers, or similar syndromes. Subsequent
visits for the same illness are not recorded in subsequent
DNBI reports; however, future clinic visits associated with
new episodes would be recorded for any given individual.
Distinct episodes were defined according the judgment of
the clinical provider.
The primary outcome, mean weekly initial visit rate per
1000 sailors for the IGI category, was estimated for all
ships during the 52-week period using Poisson regression
modeling DNBI initial visit counts with person-weeks as
exposure (weekly total force of the reporting unit) and
estimating exact (Clopper-Pearson) 95% confidence
intervals. In addition, because an individual ship could
provide more than one weekly report during the surveil-
lance period the assumption of independence among
observations could be violated and was addressed by add-
ing a correction for repeated measures by specifying the
individual ship unit as a cluster in the model [16]. Possi-
ble IGI outbreaks were defined as episodes for which an
individual ship reported rates that exceeded the upper
limit of the 95% confidence interval for all ship-weeks of
observation combined during two or more consecutive
weeks. Consecutive outbreaks were discriminated if IGI
rates fell below the 95% confidence level for two or more
consecutive weeks between subsequent outbreaks.
No standard methodology exists to define what consti-
tutes an outbreak in this population and setting. Based on
infectious disease epidemiology, particularly in the area of
diarrhea and vomiting illness of military importance, we
chose an outbreak definition that would be specific to
viral gastroenteridities by agents such as norovirus (high
risk of person-to-person transmission and incapacitating
illness). Outbreaks attributed to these viruses have been
described to persist beyond one week among shipboard
settings [3,12,13,17-19]. Possible outbreaks that met this
definition were further evaluated for every week of obser-
vation available, and the duration of the outbreak was
determined to include any visits the week prior to and the
week after the period when rates exceeded the upper limit
threshold. The inclusion of antecedent and subsequent
cases in the cumulative case total and outbreak duration
was used to account for the lead-in and tail periods which
occur in these types of person-to-person outbreaks.
Cumulative attack rates (AR) were calculated based onPage 2 of 7
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board population during the possible outbreak period.
These possible outbreaks were further described in rela-
tion to duration of outbreak, ship type, and season.
Though all ships are unique in design and function, for
the purpose of this study, in addition to describing the
particular class of ship (e.g. Aircraft Carrier, Amphibious
Assault, Combat Support, Frigate, Destroyer, Cruiser),
ship type was collapsed based on size defined as large (on
average ≥ 1000 person) and small (<1000). This roughly
breaks down into carriers and amphibious assault ships
(large ships) versus others (small ships). Based on known
climatologic features of the area of operation (Persian
Gulf), calendar year was dichotomized into two seasons:
summer (extremely hot), lasting April to October and
winter (relatively mild), lasting from November to March.
In addition, we evaluated differences in morbidity by
summing aggregative rates of sick-in-quarters (SIQ) (a
medical disposition given to those who are not allowed to
return to work for up to 72 hours), hospital admissions
and lost work-days restricting analysis to only the large
ships during periods of possible outbreaks compared to
periods when no outbreak was occurring. Data on mor-
bidity measurements including days SIQ and hospital
admissions were compiled weekly at the aggregate level
for all ships reporting. Therefore, comparisons of morbid-
ity at the individual ship level could not be assessed. The
restriction of this analysis to large ships was due to the
aggregate nature of the data as the small number of visits
associated with outbreaks on small ships would not be
able to be distinguished from relatively high background
visit rates of larger ships. Therefore, to assess whether
there was differential morbidity during possible outbreak
weeks compared to non-outbreak weeks, we included
only possible outbreak periods and non-outbreak periods
during which outbreaks occurred on large ships.
Statistical testing of differences in rates between different
ship sizes was conducted using incidence-rate ratio esti-
mation with exact confidence interval estimation in Stata
Version 8 (College Station, TX). Statistical significance
was set at p < 0.05.
Results
Weekly DNBI reports from a total of 44 ships, accounting
for 331 ship-weeks (mean 7.5 weeks/ship), were received
during the deployment period. This represented approxi-
mately 29% of a ships' total 6-month deployment time.
The remaining time of ships' deployments were accumu-
lated during transit in and out of the CENTCOM AOR and
were not available for review. During the study period,
1,351 visits for IGI were reported during 339,153 person-
weeks of observation resulting in an IGI clinic visits sum-
mary rate for all ships of 4.0 per 1000 person-weeks (Pois-
son Exact 95% C.I.: 3.8, 4.3). Using the upper 95% C.I. as
an upper control limit, we identified 11 possible out-
breaks among 10 ships (Figure 1). Overall, mean outbreak
duration was 4.4 weeks (Poisson Exact 95% C.I.: 2.6, 6.2)
and the mean cumulative ship population AR was 3.6%
(Poisson Exact 95% C.I.: 3.3, 3.8).
There was differential distribution of possible outbreaks
on different types of ships (Table 1); outbreaks occurred
on four of the six ship classes (frigates and cruisers did not
have any episodes meeting the outbreak definition). Out-
break rates were higher for the larger ships with 6.6 out-
breaks per 100 ship-weeks, compared to the smaller ships
with 2.6 outbreaks per 100 ship-weeks, but this difference
was not statistically significant (Incidence-rate ratio 2.5,
Possible infectious GI outbreaks among ships deployed to the Persian Gulf AOR during October 2000 – September 2001Figure 1
Possible infectious GI outbreaks among ships deployed to the Persian Gulf AOR during October 2000 – September 2001. 
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one amphibious assault ship), the cumulative AR was
3.7% with a mean duration of 3.8 weeks compared to the
smaller ships with cumulative AR of 3.6% and a mean
duration of five weeks (data not shown). The months of
January and May were found to have the most number of
outbreaks (figure 1).
There were 611 IGI visits during non-outbreak weeks (n =
36 weeks) and 777 visits during outbreak weeks (n = 15
weeks). Based on analysis of aggregated data, there were a
total of eight hospital admissions due to IGI during the
study period, two of which occurred during a week when
there was a possible outbreak on one of the ships and six
admissions during a week when there was no outbreak
activity recorded. This equates to approximately 9.8 hos-
pital admissions per 1000 IGI visits during non-outbreak
weeks compared to 2.6 hospital admissions per 1000 IGI
visits during outbreak weeks (Poisson, p = 0.047). Addi-
tionally, there were 213 SIQ days given during non-out-
break weeks compared to 350 SIQ days given during
outbreak weeks. This equates to 45 days of SIQ for every
100 IGI visits during an outbreak week compared to 34.9
days of SIQ for every 100 IGI visits in non-outbreak weeks
(Poisson, p = 0.002).
Discussion
Our analyses indicate that IGI outbreaks are common
occurrences aboard U.S. Navy ships in this region. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first study to estimate the
incidence of IGI outbreaks among deployed U.S. Navy
ships. We found an overall incidence of 33.2 outbreaks
per 1000 ship-weeks (Poisson 95% CI 16.6 – 59.5). A
recent epidemiologic study published on IGI outbreaks
among vacation cruise ships (median cruise duration of
one week) found an outbreak frequency of 6.3 outbreaks
per 1000 cruises (ship-weeks) during 1990 – 1995, and
was reduced to 3.7 outbreaks per 1000 cruises during
1996–2000 [20]. This decrease may have been attributa-
ble to vigilance by public health and industry officials in
control of person-to-person spread of illness among crew
and passengers and environmental disinfection [21].
Cruise ships and Navy ships are different environments
with different populations; therefore, comparisons of
incidence may be misleading and should be avoided. The
high rate of outbreaks among U.S. Navy ships may be
explained by younger age (higher risk-taking population),
higher risk ports visited by U.S. Navy ships, much longer
time at sea, and/or the methods we used to define out-
breaks.
The cumulative ARs in this study are similar to rates previ-
ously reported (SA Thornton, personal communication),
but much lower than rates described in other IGI outbreak
investigations among Navy ships [3,12,13,15]. Among 15
Norovirus-confirmed outbreaks, Thornton found a mean
cumulative AR of 5.3%, slightly higher than what we
found. This is likely due to the fact that his study used
active surveillance methodology, while we relied on pas-
sive reporting. We also found cumulative attack rates that
were lower than those reported among cruise ships. In a
recent account of six reported outbreaks among five cruise
ships during July 1 2002 to December 2002, attack rates
based on sick-call visits ranged between 2.5 – 11.5% of all
shipboard persons (median 6.1) [22]. A number of rea-
sons could explain the differences in attack rates includ-
ing, differences among shipboard health seeking behavior
and the limitation of the surveillance window within this
study possibly resulting in under-capture of all visits asso-
ciated with a given outbreak. Despite finding lower attack
rates, eight of eleven of the possible outbreaks we
described equaled or exceeded the 3% attack rate that is
used to trigger an outbreak in the cruise ship industry. As
others have pointed out, the AR based on medical clinic
visits likely underestimates the total number of cases asso-
ciated with these outbreaks [21]. For example in one
cruise ship outbreak it was found that while 8% of the pas-
sengers reported to sick call with acute gastroenteritis
Table 1: Characteristics of possible outbreaks by ship class in the 5th fleet during October 2000 – September 2001
Ship Type Average 
shipboard 
population









AR2 (per 100 
ship-weeks)
Carrier 4951 5 45 3 2.7 3.3 6.7
Amphibious 
assault
669 7 56 2 5.0 7.5 3.5
Cruiser 384 6 50 0 na na na
Destroyer 321 18 120 5 5.4 3.8 4.2
Combat 
Support
551 3 22 1 (3.0) (1.6) 4.5
Frigate 237 5 38 0 na na na
1. calculation based on only those ships within the class with outbreaks
2. Rate of possible outbreaks per ship-week of observation time
na = not applicablePage 4 of 7
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ing a subsequent epidemiologic investigation (75% of
passengers surveyed) [22]. In our study, we were unable to
ascertain the full extent of IGI due to the passive surveil-
lance methods used by the DNBI reporting system.
The outbreak definition we used is novel and may or may
not compare equally to the Vessel Sanitation Program
(VSP) classification. The VSP defines outbreaks if = 3% of
the passengers and/or crewmembers develops AGE symp-
toms. This cutoff, developed by the CDC, was based on
previous data of ship-associated outbreaks where the inci-
dence of gastrointestinal illness was found to be = 1% of
92% of cruises and = 3% on 3% of cruises [23]. Our out-
break cut-point was based on retrospective analysis of a
cohort of U.S. Navy ships deployed to the region over a
one-year period. Only prospective evaluation of such a
method with attempts to identify etiologic causes of these
outbreaks can inform whether this method is sensitive
and specific.
Outbreaks were found throughout the year, which is
inconsistent with previous reports of IGI outbreaks
among cruise ships which have demonstrated a winter-
spring predominance and where Norovirus is implicated in
69% of these outbreaks [24]. It is an assumption that the
outbreaks in our study are due to Norovirus-related dis-
ease, since a surveillance report among investigated GI
outbreaks aboard large U.S. Navy ships identified Norovi-
rus in 4 out of 4 which submitted stool specimens for test-
ing Norovirus-confirmed outbreaks [25]. In addition, at
least one of the eleven possible outbreaks identified in our
study was found to be associated with Norovirus based on
a concurrent surveillance study being conducted (SA
Thornton, personal communications). The lack of a sea-
sonality of outbreaks in our study could be explained by a
number of reasons. In this equatorial region, while a sea-
son of warm and cold can be delineated, differentiation
between seasons are very different than temperate cli-
mates, thus a seasonal distribution for these viruses may
not be found [26-28]. Furthermore, these ships often
acquire their outbreaks during visits to other equatorial
parts of the world and arrive in the CENTCOM AOR with
an outbreak already underway.
We also found that larger ships had more frequent out-
breaks than smaller ships (6.6 per 100 ship-weeks vs. 2.6
per 100 ship-weeks, respectfully). One explanation is that
larger ships often transport operational forces during
deployments, with multiple embarkations and debarka-
tions, thereby possibly introducing new enteric pathogens
to shipboard personnel. It is also possible that there were
differences in port visit schedules (e.g., increased number,
longer duration, etc.) between the different ship classes
that could account for increased risk of outbreaks. A com-
mon theme among a number of case reports has been that
crowding is likely to play a role in these outbreaks
[3,12,13]. One recent report published in Navy Medicine
details a shipboard outbreak possibly due to viral gastro-
enteritis and suggests that communal toileting facilities
and population density may contribute the increased risk
of outbreaks [29]. Lastly, the case definition that was uti-
lized may have resulted in fewer outbreaks associated with
smaller ships, as perhaps with smaller ships outbreaks
would have been recognized sooner and control measures
more easily implemented. While cumulative ARs appear
to be similar among the different ship classes, the dura-
tion of outbreaks appear to be longer on the smaller ships.
The reason for this finding is not clear and may be due to
chance or different population density and transmission
dynamics among different shipboard architectures and/or
populations. Differential duration of surveillance win-
dows between large and small ships does not explain this
finding either as most ships types were under observation
on average 7 – 9 weeks, with only destroyers (small ship)
with a shorter average surveillance window of 6.7 weeks.
While our analysis of morbidity associated with these pos-
sible outbreaks was hindered due to the aggregate nature
of the data, we did find an increase in the amount of SIQ
given during weeks when there were outbreaks, compared
to weeks when there were no outbreaks. However, there
was less hospitalization. This finding suggests that there
may be a difference in severity of illnesses during out-
breaks, which results in more days lost (SIQ), but requires
fewer hospitalizations. The higher rate of SIQ given dur-
ing outbreak weeks may also be reflective of a control
strategy for IGI outbreaks, whereby ill persons are effec-
tively removed from the workplace for 48–72 hours dur-
ing the period where infectious agent shedding may be
very high. Thus, the assertion of higher morbidity during
outbreaks as measured by rates of SIQ may be con-
founded. The estimation of work days lost may be an
underestimate as Whittaker et al. reported that during a
large IGI outbreak aboard an aircraft carrier, only patients
requiring treatment in the clinic were given SIQ status
[14]. Thus, an undercounting of work-time lost due to ill-
ness may occur during large outbreaks. Due to the aggre-
gate nature of this data and low numbers of
hospitalizations, efforts should be made to confirm this
differential morbidity before drawing any definite conclu-
sions.
The methodology utilized in this study to define IGI out-
breaks is novel and has several limitations. DNBI surveil-
lance data collected and reported at the aggregate level is
used for the purpose of tracking trends and identifying
possible clusters across a broad range of clinical syn-
dromes grouped into non-specific disease and injury cate-
gories. While this design appears useful for its intendedPage 5 of 7
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each reporting ship, and across specific clinical syndromes
within broad disease categories (e.g. catch-all IGI cate-
gory), limits the inferences one can draw compared to
more traditional individual unit of observation based epi-
demiological studies. Therefore, the results of this study
should be put in context, and the derived estimates of par-
ticular outbreak attributes (e.g. outbreak rates, population
attack rates, outbreak durations, and disease morbidity
comparisons) may not be comparable to other epidemio-
logical studies which use more traditional outbreak inves-
tigation designs. Specifically, the definition of IGI visits
exceeding an upper 95% confidence (among all ships
reporting) for two consecutive weeks would likely result
in missing shorter outbreaks (decreased sensitivity) which
are probably more commonly attributable to other com-
mon bacterial causes and a point source mode of trans-
mission. The choice of this definition was for purposes of
specificity to detect viral gastroenteritidies which can
appear from a point-source introduction but tend to dem-
onstrate a person-to-person mode of transmission with
longer outbreak durations. In addition, this choice of def-
inition may bias towards increasing the duration esti-
mates of the described outbreaks. However, to balance
this is the observation that many outbreaks were not fol-
lowed to complete resolution due to the surveillance win-
dow for a particular ship ending due to its movement out
of the surveillance system, thus, resulting in a possible
bias towards shortening the length of a given outbreak.
Furthermore, it was a limitation of our data that the inci-
dence measurements made were only based on denomi-
nator ship-time within the CENTCOM AOR. Future
studies directed at the entire deployment period should
be conducted to accurate describe the true rate of these
possible outbreaks.
Conclusion
This study is a preliminary investigation to describe possi-
ble IGI outbreaks aboard U.S. Navy ships deployed to the
Middle East. Despite the limitations of this methodology
in defining possible outbreaks aboard U.S. Navy ships,
the findings complement numerous anecdotal reports of
IGI outbreaks. This is the first study that has estimated the
rate of outbreaks and should serve to prompt further stud-
ies using methodology specific for the purpose of detect-
ing, measuring and attributing cause to shipboard IGI
outbreaks. We show that IGI outbreaks are common
among shipboard personnel and that further studies are
needed to ascertain etiology, scope, as well as contributing
factors that increase outbreak risk and morbidity. In addi-
tion to sea-based studies, epidemiologic studies are also
needed among land-based deployed military personnel to
assess the impact of outbreak-associated IGI and to differ-
entiate risk factors that may be specific to sea-going ves-
sels. Whatever the cause of these possible shipboard IGI
outbreaks, the epidemic potential, combined with the
associated morbidity, suggests an immediate need for
research and development of rapid identification assays,
outbreak intervention strategies, and prophylaxis and
treatment modalities where troop readiness and mission
capabilities are at stake.
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